US in Bagram Airbase: China and Russia to lose influence

Implications of a US Permanent Base at Bagram Airbase, Considering India-US Mistrust and Divergent Strategic Interests

The prospect of the United States re-establishing a permanent military base at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan—amid recent statements from President Donald Trump emphasizing its proximity to China's nuclear facilities—carries significant risks, particularly when viewed through the lens of longstanding India-US mistrust. This mistrust stems from historical divergences in Afghanistan policy, such as the US's reliance on Pakistan as a key ally (despite India's concerns over Pakistan's support for Taliban-linked groups), the abrupt 2021 US withdrawal that destabilized the region and empowered anti-India elements, and broader strategic differences where the US prioritizes countering China globally while India seeks regional stability without foreign military footprints that could provoke escalation. India has invested over $3 billion in Afghan reconstruction since 2001, focusing on soft power like infrastructure and education, but views US actions as erratic and self-serving, potentially undermining New Delhi's hard-won diplomatic gains with the Taliban post-2021.

If realized, a US base at Bagram could exacerbate these frictions, leading to the following implications:

Heightened Regional Instability and Terrorism Risks for India:

Bagram's location, just 50 km north of Kabul and near the Pakistan border, could reignite proxy conflicts. Pakistan, a US partner in this scenario, might interpret the base as a green light to intensify support for anti-India militants (e.g., Lashkar-e-Taiba affiliates operating from Afghan soil). This would amplify cross-border terrorism threats to India, such as attacks in Jammu & Kashmir, contradicting India's core interest in a Taliban-led but stable Afghanistan free from external meddling. The 2021 US withdrawal already allowed the Taliban to consolidate power, and a US return could fracture this fragile equilibrium, drawing India into unwanted escalations without US guarantees—echoing the "strategic disconnect" where Washington props up Pakistan at New Delhi's expense.

Erosion of India's Diplomatic Leverage and Unlikely Alliances:

India's recent pragmatic engagement with the Taliban (e.g., hosting their foreign minister in October 2025 and resuming aid via Chabahar Port) has built cautious trust, positioning New Delhi as a neutral development partner amid US absence. A US base would force India into an awkward alignment against its own Quad partner, as evidenced by India's rare unity with Pakistan, China, and Russia at the Moscow Format Consultations in October 2025 to oppose "foreign military infrastructure." This could strain India-US ties further, signaling to New Delhi that Washington's "Indo-Pacific" focus on China bypasses South Asian realities, deepening mistrust over US reliability. Domestically, it might fuel criticism in India of over-reliance on the US, pushing New Delhi toward greater autonomy or even closer ties with Russia for arms and energy.

Economic and Humanitarian Setbacks:

India has channeled aid through projects like the Salma Dam and Parliament building, fostering goodwill. A US base could disrupt these by provoking Taliban retaliation or economic sanctions from anti-US powers, halting trade routes via Chabahar (bypassing Pakistan). With India already facing a "trust deficit" with the Taliban due to its historical anti-Taliban stance, this could reverse gains in Afghan stability, increasing refugee flows and radicalization that spill over into India—exacerbating humanitarian burdens without US burden-sharing.

Broader Geopolitical Backlash Against India:

Divergent interests—US's aggressive containment of China versus India's multi-alignment (balancing Quad with Russia ties)—could isolate India if the base sparks a "new Great Game." Pakistan might exploit US presence to demand concessions on Kashmir, while a destabilized Afghanistan undermines India's Central Asian connectivity dreams (e.g., via the International North-South Transport Corridor). Ultimately, this reinforces India's wariness of US "overreach," as seen in past divergences over Taliban talks, where Washington sidelined New Delhi's inclusive vision for Kabul.

In summary, while a US base might offer short-term checks on China (aligning with US goals), it would likely amplify India's security dilemmas, diplomatic isolation, and economic vulnerabilities, widening the chasm of mistrust born from the US's Pakistan tilt and post-withdrawal chaos.

What China and Russia Stand to Lose from a US Permanent Base at Bagram

A US foothold at Bagram—strategically positioned ~800 km from China's Xinjiang border and ~2,400 km from key nuclear sites—would disrupt the post-2021 power vacuum that China and Russia have leveraged to expand influence in Afghanistan. Both nations have deepened ties with the Taliban (Russia formally recognized it in 2025; China via Belt and Road investments), viewing the country as a buffer against US encirclement.

For China:

1. Strategic Vulnerabilities in Xinjiang and Nuclear Security: Bagram's surveillance capabilities could monitor Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang and nuclear facilities, heightening Beijing's paranoia over "separatism" and forcing costly border fortifications. Trump explicitly cited this proximity as a rationale, framing it as a "nuclear gamble" that escalates US-China flashpoints.
2. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Disruptions: China has invested billions in Afghan minerals (lithium, copper) and CPEC extensions, using Kabul as a westward corridor. A US base risks Taliban instability, project sabotage, or US sanctions, compelling China to reroute via Pakistan (bypassing Afghanistan) at higher costs and delaying BRI goals.
3. Regional Influence Erosion: Beijing's "constructive involvement" as an alternative to Western intervention would be undermined, pushing Afghanistan toward US orbit and isolating China diplomatically. This could unite Indo-Pacific foes (US, India, Japan) against BRI, amplifying economic losses from disrupted trade.

For Russia:

1. Loss of Central Asian Buffer and Influence: Bagram threatens Moscow's "near abroad" in Tajikistan/Uzbekistan, reviving Soviet-era fears of US encirclement. Russia's 2025 Taliban recognition secured arms deals and anti-ISIS cooperation; a US return could fracture this, portraying Russia as a junior partner to China and weakening its Eurasian Economic Union leverage.
2. Counterterrorism and Diplomatic Setbacks: Russia uses Afghanistan to combat ISIS-K threats spilling into its sphere; US presence might co-opt these efforts, sidelining Moscow's Moscow Format role. This erodes Russia's post-Ukraine diplomatic clout in Asia, forcing reliance on China amid sanctions.
3. Economic and Energy Gains Undermined: Russian firms eye Afghan gas/minerals for Central Asian pipelines; instability from a US base could halt these, hitting energy exports and deepening economic isolation.

In essence, China and Russia would forfeit a sphere of influence, facing intensified containment and economic hurdles—ironically uniting them further with India in opposition.